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This  paper  reports  the  progress  of  nominal  and  real  convergence  of  Spain,  Portugal  and 
Greece during their accession to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). When the EMU was 
designed, it was hoped that it would induce nominal convergence (convergence of interest rates 
and  inflation  rates)  and  stimulate  investments  and  economic  growth  through  its  positive 
microeconomic effects. As had been expected, nominal interest rates have converged quite early 
during the accession, output has been growing fast, and the countries experienced an inflow of 
foreign direct investments (FDI) and an increase of domestic investment rates. However, once 
within the EMU, all three countries experienced persistently higher inflation rates, which may be 
consistent with the convergence of price levels, instead of inflation. While all the above phenomena 
can be related to the EMU accession, in an econometric estimation for Spain in which we control 
for macroeconomic policies, we are unable to detect significant microeconomic effects of the EMU. 
Therefore, we conclude that it is the policies induced by the necessity to satisfy the Maastricht 
criteria  that  matter  primarily  for  the  macroeconomic  performance  soon  after  accession.  In  any 
case, the experience of the SPG is encouraging for the new member states facing accession to the 
EMU in the future. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Nominal and Real Convergence in Spain, Portugal and Greece… 
1  Introduction 
The euro has been created in order to bring stability and prosperity to all members of the 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (EMU).  This  overview  concentrates  on  the  impact  of  the  EMU 
accession  on  only  a  subset  of  the  union  members:  Spain,  Portugal  and  Greece  (ordered  by 
decreasing size, later referred to as SPG). Only in the mid-1970’s all three of them emerged from 
dictatorships, with highly distortive and inefficient, autarkic economic systems, and their level of 
economic development still lags behind the European ‘core’. Also, until recently, these countries 
have had inflation rates and fiscal deficits higher than the European average. These features make 
their experience in the EMU qualitatively similar, and particularly relevant for the new member 
states (NMS), which are bound to join the common currency soon after the EU accession. 
The euro is still a new phenomenon and certainly not all its consequences have manifested 
themselves yet. The performance of the common currency and of the economies of the euro area 
countries has been mixed. It is too early for a final assessment, as it is difficult to isolate the effect 
of the euro from that of other, unrelated economic policies and developments. Nevertheless, many 
early attempts of an assessment of the effects of the euro are already being made, and some of 
them are cited below. 
It would be incorrect to treat the EMU accession as a one-off act. It entailed a long sequence 
of political events. The process gained momentum after the Delors Report (1989) which proposed 
the  three  stages  leading  to  the  EMU  and  the  Maastricht  Summit  in  1992,  which  put  the 
implementation  of  the  Report  firmly  on  track.  The  political  events  were  influencing  market 
expectations and shaping macroeconomic policies as they were emerging. The final, culminative 
part of this sequence is presented below for later reference: 
 
June 1997   ERM II+Stability and Growth pact 
March 1998  Greek drachma included in the ERM II 
2 May 1998  Decision by the Council of the EU that 11 Member States fulfilled the conditions for the 
adoption of euro, fixing irrevocable rates at the level of ERM II rates. The decision was 
based on the 1997 data. 
1 January 1999  Irrevocable fixing of exchange rates 
19 June 2000   Decision that Greece fulfilled criteria on the basis of 1999 data. 
1 January 2001  Greece enters EMU 
January 2002   Euro in circulation. 
Source: ECB Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Marek Jarociński 
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2  The expected effect of the EMU  
The ex ante expectations of the designers of the EMU, as formulated in the Delors Report 
(1989) and the One Market, One Money report (Emerson 1992) are following: 
2.1  Nominal convergence 
1.  Disappearance  of  the  exchange  rate  risk  after  the  introduction  of  euro  will  cause 
convergence  of  interest  rates  on  similar  assets.  Even  before  that,  in  the  ERM  phase  “…  the 
national currencies will be becoming ever more close substitutes and their interest rates will tend to 
converge.  The  pace  of  this  evolution  will  be  determined  by  the  degree  to  which  enterprises, 
households, trade unions and other economic agents will be convinced about the irreversibility of 
the decision to fix the exchange rates.” (Delors Report, 1989, p.6) 
2. Under the common monetary policy inflation rates will converge across countries. 
The SPG are in a particularly suitable position to benefit from these two effects, since for them 
nominal convergence means reduction of both interest rates and inflation rates. 
2.2  Real convergence 
The main motivation for creation of the EMU is its expected positive effect on economic growth 
of all its members. “Creation of the single monetary zone will reinforce the potential advantages of 
the  common  market  as  it  will  reduce  the  uncertainties  related  to  trade  within  the  Community, 
diminish  the  transaction  costs,  eliminate  the  variability  of  the  exchange  rates  and  reduce  the 
sensitivity  of  the  Community  to  external  shocks.”  (Delors  Report  1989,  p.8).  One  Market  One 
Money report (ch.3) discusses these mechanisms at length and stresses also that the reduced 
uncertainty should encourage investment. 
While  output  growth  is  expected  in  all  member  countries,  poorer  and  richer  alike,  the  net 
impact of the monetary union on the real convergence (convergence of real income per capita) is 
by  no  means  clear.  The  conclusion  depends  on  which  of  the  alternative  economic  theories  is 
employed. 
The neoclassical growth model in general predicts convergence, driven by diminishing returns 
to production factors. Capital inflows to poorer countries, unskilled labor outflows to richer ones 
and trade integration should accelerate the process. The EMU, bringing reduction of the exchange 
rate risk, should stimulate efficient FDI allocation and trade, and result in an unambiguously faster 
convergence. 
On the other extreme is the prediction of endogenous growth models and economic geography 
models. These models stress the existence of externalities, agglomeration effects and resulting 
increasing returns to scale. Consistently with this line of research, the common currency and closer Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Nominal and Real Convergence in Spain, Portugal and Greece… 
trade integration will only facilitate and encourage capital outflows from less developed to already 
successful regions and result in income divergence. 
As  discussed  in  Canova  and  Boldrin  (2001)  the  European  Commission  seemed  to  give  a 
measure  of  support  to  both  views.  On  the  one  hand,  it  touted  the  EMU  as  contributing  to 
convergence. On the other hand, it stressed the indispensability of Cohesion Funds accompanying 
the ever closer integration. The Delors Report (1989, section 29, p.8) said: “The Economic and 
Monetary union can have beneficial effects on the disadvantaged regions of the Community. For 
example, regions with low wages will have a possibility to attract modern enterprises and expand 
the services and manufacturing sectors, for which the choice of location is not primarily determined 
by  the  transportation costs,  qualifications  of  the  labor  force  and  proximity  to  the  markets.  The 
experience shows, however, that in the absence of compensating policies, the global effect on the 
peripheral  regions  could  be  negative.  The  transportation  costs  and  economies  of  scale  could 
displace economic activities towards highly developed regions in the center of the Community, to 
the harm of the less favored regions, in particular in the peripheries.” Consequently, the report 
advocates doubling of the EU Structural Funds. 
The following sections review the available evidence on how the expectations of convergence 
were being fulfilled so far. The discussion starts with the description of the initial conditions. 
3  Initial conditions 
SPG  had  been  members  of  the  EU  since  the  1980’s,  for  a  significant  time  before  the 
emergence of the common currency. Therefore, the initial impact of the EU membership had been 
already  realized  and  their  position  in  mid-1990’s  could  be  characteristic  of  their  medium  term 
situation in the EU. Table 1 shows the snapshot of some macroeconomic indicators in SPG in 
1995. With respect to these indicators, the SPG are all in a similar position relative to the average 
of the euro area. 
Table 1. Real per capita income in PPP (estimates of Eurostat and Heston at al. (2002) Penn World 
Tables), price level and long-term interest rates in Spain, Portugal and Greece in 1995, compared 
with the euro area average 
  GDP ECU 
mln (1) 
GDP PPP 















EuroZone  5 308 886  101.6  19 106  1.00  120.9  1.00  3.0  9.2 
Spain  446 882  78.4  15 992  0.84  93.1  0.77  4.7  11.3 
Portugal  82 887  70.9  12 907  0.68  83.8  0.69  3.8  11.5 
Greece  89 889  66.1  12 218  0.64  92.0  0.76  9.0  17.4 
Sources: (1) and (2) Eurostat, (3) Per capita GDP in comparable prices, Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (PWT6.1), 
Heston, Summers, Aten  (2002), (4) Price level of GDP, PWT6.1; (5), (6) Eurostat data after EMI (1996) 
The three countries’ GDP constituted below 12% of the GDP of the common currency area, 
compared with their 20% share in terms of population. As Table 1 shows, the reason is both that Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Marek Jarociński 
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their per capita GDP in PPP was lower, and because they have lower domestic price levels relative 
to exchange rates. Thus, per capita PPP GDP varied between 84% of the euro area average for 
Spain (by the more optimistic measure) to 64% for Greece (by the more conservative measure). 
The  price  level  series  provided  in  Heston’s  et  al.  (2002)  Penn  World  Tables  (PWT)  are  very 
volatile, but it is safe to claim that in all three countries price level was consistently below the 
average for the Euro area. 
The inflation rate in the SPG was higher than average, reflecting looser monetary policies and 
lack of reputation of their monetary authorities for guarding the price stability. Finally, the SPG had 
higher  long  term  interest  rates, which  reflects  their  higher  inflations,  and,  probably,  higher  risk 
premia demanded by the financial markets. 
Given this starting position at the beginning of the EMU accession, the expected nominal and 
real convergence should be manifested in a reduction of interest rates and inflation, and a strong 
economic growth. 
4  Economic policies and developments during accession 
4.1  Towards meeting of the Maastricht criteria 
The Maastricht Treaty, which set institutional foundations for the common currency, included 
the well-known convergence criteria to be fulfilled by successful applicants to the EMU. The criteria 
included ceilings on the inflation rate (at most 1.5 percentage points above the average of the three 
lowest inflation countries), budget deficit (3%), debt/GDP ratio (60% maximum), long-term interest 
rate (at most 2 percentage points above the average of the three lowest long-term interest rate 
countries) and the required 2-year period of stability of the exchange rate within the ERM. These 
strict requirements were watered down somewhat by clauses, which allowed breaching the criteria 
exceptionally, or even systematically, provided a clear trend towards compliance was observed. 
Nevertheless,  the  Maastricht  criteria  had  been  shaping  the  economic  policies  of  the  future 
members  at  least  since  ratification  (around  1995),  and  to  a  large  extent  already  since  the 
Maastricht summit in 1993. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Nominal and Real Convergence in Spain, Portugal and Greece… 
Table 2 below shows countries’ performance with respect to inflation, fiscal position and public 
debt. 
Table  2.  Inflation  rates  (CPI  and  HICP),  fiscal  balance/GDP  and  debt/GDP  in  Spain,  Portugal  and 
Greece in 1995-2002 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Spain                 
Inflation CPI  4.7%  3.6%  2.0%  1.8%  2.3%  3.4%  3.6%  3.1% 
Inflation HICP  -  3.6%  1.8%  1.8%  2.2%  3.5%  2.8%  3.6% 
fiscal balance/GDP  -7.1%  -5.0%  -3.2%  -2.6%  -1.1%  -0.3%  0.0%  - 
debt/GDP  64.2%  68.0%  66.7%  64.6%  63.1%  60.4%  57.2%  - 
Portugal                 
Inflation CPI  4.1%  3.1%  2.2%  2.7%  2.3%  2.9%  4.4%  3.6% 
Inflation HICP  -  2.9%  1.9%  -  2.1%  2.8%  4.4%  3.7% 
fiscal balance/GDP  -5.7%  -3.8%  -2.7%  -2.3%  -2.2%  -1.5%  -2.2%  - 
debt/GDP  65.9%  63.6%  59.1%  54.8%  54.2%  53.2%  55.6%  - 
Greece                 
Inflation CPI  8.9%  8.2%  5.5%  4.8%  2.6%  3.2%  3.4%  3.6% 
Inflation HICP  -  7.9%  5.4%  4.6%  2.1%  2.9%  3.7%  3.9% 
fiscal balance/GDP  -10.2%  -7.8%  -4.6%  -2.5%  -1.8%  -0.8%  -0.1%  -0.4% 
debt/GDP  108.7%  111.3%  108.5%  105.4%  104.6%  102.1%  107.0%  103.2% 
Sources: IFS, EMI (1996), (1998), Central Banks of Spain, Portugal and Greece. Bold face highlights data which was the 
basis for the qualification for the EMU accession (1997 for Spain and Portugal and 1999 for Greece). 
We see fiscal deficits being reduced every year prior to the decision on accession (1997 for 
Spain  and  Portugal,  1999  for  Greece).  As  a  result  of  this,  tight  monetary  policy  and  stable 
exchange rates, inflation was squeezed below the reference rates. Debt ratios were also falling, 
albeit with some slippage in the case of Spain in 1996. Not all of the countries actually achieved 
the 60% threshold (in Greece it never fell below 100%), but the progress in reducing debt ratios 
was judged by the Council of EU to be satisfactory. 
Fiscal position remained tight also after the accession. This is a particularly valuable indirect 
effect of the EMU, especially in light of the proposition of Perotti (1996) and references cited there, 
that persistent fiscal adjustments tend to have positive effects on growth already in the short term. 
Inflation rates rebounded after the accession. This phenomenon is discussed in more detail in 
section 5.2. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Marek Jarociński 
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4.2  Investments and Balance of Payments   
Table 3 below illustrates the behavior of Balance of Payments and national investment rates in the 
SPG. 
Table 3. Current Account Balance and FDI as a share of Exports (goods and services) and GDP, 
Investment share in GDP 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Spain                 
CAB/Exports  0.6%  0.3%  1.7%  -1.9%  -8.3%  -11.3%  -9.3%  -8.4% 
FDI/Exports  4.7%  4.6%  4.2%  7.4%  9.4%  21.8%  15.8%  11.3% 
CAB/GDP  0.1%  0.1%  0.4%  -0.5%  -2.3%  -3.4%  -2.8%  -2.4% 
FDI/GDP  1.1%  1.1%  1.1%  2.0%  2.6%  6.6%  4.8%  3.3% 
I/GDP  22.0%  21.6%  21.9%  22.8%  24.1%  25.3%  25.0%  25.4% 
I/GDP PWT  22.0%  23.2%  23.2%  24.0%  24.6%  25.5%  -  - 
Portugal                 
CAB/Exports  -0.4%  -15.5%  -19.4%  -22.7%  -28.5%  -33.0%  -30.5%  -24.7% 
FDI/Exports  2.1%  5.1%  7.6%  9.1%  3.6%  20.3%  17.1%  11.5% 
CAB/GDP  -0.1%  -4.7%  -6.1%  -7.0%  -8.5%  -10.4%  -9.4%  -7.5% 
FDI/GDP  0.6%  1.5%  2.4%  2.8%  1.1%  6.4%  5.3%  3.5% 
I/GDP  23.1%  23.2%  24.1%  24.7%  28.3%  29.2%  28.1%  25.8% 
I/GDP PWT  23.8%  23.7%  25.4%  26.6%  26.5%  27.2%  -  - 
Greece                 
CAB/Exports  -18.5%  -29.9%  -32.7%  -  -29.1%  -33.4%  -31.3%  -34.6% 
FDI/Exports  6.8%  6.9%  6.6%  -  2.3%  3.7%  5.3%  0.2% 
CAB/GDP  -2.4%  -3.7%  -4.0%  -3.2%  -4.1%  -6.9%  -6.0%  -6.6% 
FDI/GDP  0.9%  0.9%  0.8%  -  0.5%  1.0%  1.4%  0.0% 
I/GDP  18.6%  19.5%  19.8%  21.1%  21.7%  22.6%  22.8%  23.0% 
I/GDP PWT  19.5%  20.4%  20.8%  21.8%  21.3%  22.8%  -  - 
Sources: IFS, except investment share in GDP at comparable prices (I/GDP PWT) PWT6.1. 
Prior to the accession, Spain has had an almost balanced current account, while Greece and 
Portugal have had significant deficits. Current account balance as a share of exports is sometimes 
used as a rough proxy for the devaluation that would be needed to attain equilibrium (assuming 
unit export elasticity, as e.g. Gros (2002)). On this crude measure, Spain entered the EMU with a 
roughly correct parity, while Greek drachma and Portuguese escudo were considerably (20-30%) 
overvalued, in spite of the drachma devaluation in 1997. 
The SPG had a positive inflow of foreign direct investments throughout the period, but for 
Greece and Portugal it was far from covering the current account deficit, which had to be financed Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Nominal and Real Convergence in Spain, Portugal and Greece… 
also by more risky short term capital. This, however, did not prevent them from smoothly entering 
the EMU, without much feared speculations like those that broke up the ERM in 1992. 
After the adoption of the euro all three countries slipped into larger external deficits. This could 
at first glance be interpreted as a signal of problems of country industries competing in the more 
competitive euro area market. However, the FDI inflow as well as domestic investments clearly 
increased (except Greece where FDI performance was mixed). Although FDI usually constitute a 
small  part  of  total  domestic  investments,  they  tend  to  be  positively  correlated  and  both  are 
perceived  as  a  signal  of  good  growth  perspectives.  Higher  investment  adds  to  the  domestic 
demand and tips the current account into deficit. The broad picture is therefore more compatible 
with the investment revival triggered by the opportunities of the EMU membership. 
5  Nominal Convergence 
5.1  Interest Rates (T-bonds and retail interest rates) 
Figure below illustrates the behavior of the long term interest rates, which are the subject of one of 
the Maastricht criteria. 
Figure 1. Long term interest rates of SPG and EuroZone average, monthly averages, 1990-2002 
Source: Eurostat - General Statistics - Financial Statistics – Government bond yields, 10 year (average) (%) 
The most striking feature of the graph is the convergence of the interest rates prior to or on the 
date of the EMU accession. The differences that do remain once in the Euro area (although hardly 
visible on the graph) result from different valuation by markets of country default or EMU exit risks, 
or possibly from institutional imperfections of the individual markets. These are dwarfed by the 
exchange rate risk, which had determined interest rates prior to the accession, and disappeared 
afterwards. 
The clear trend towards convergence of the interest rates started sometime in 1996, prior to 
the creation of the ERM II and the Stability and Growth Pact. By May 1998, when the membership 
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close to the euro area average for a few months. The political news could have been discounted by 
the markets for some time before. Also in Greece a significant long term interest rate convergence 
predates the admission to the EMU. 
Prior to the accession, two parallel effects reducing interest rates have been at work. First, 
fiscal  tightening  reduced  the  supply  in  the  bond  market.  Second,  both  the  fiscal  reforms  and 
subsequent political steps towards EMU membership had been increasing the market confidence 
in  the  successful  accession  and  future  disappearance  of  the  exchange  rate  risk.  It  is  hard  to 
disentangle these two effects without an econometric framework, which would allow estimation of 
the credibility effect induced by the political steps towards EMU membership, while controlling for 
the country economic policies and in addition for global conditions. So far, the conclusion is that 
some  combination  of  the  economic  policies  and  anticipation  of  the  political  events  by  market 
agents caused the significant interest rate convergence prior to the accession. 
The interest rates are directly linked to the foreign exchange markets by the uncovered interest 
rate parity: an expected depreciation should increase the interest rate by the same amount. In a 
study of volatility of the exchange rates Wilfling (2001) finds a regime switch in the volatility of the 
European FOREX markets in the late 1997. He concludes that this would be the moment when 
market expectations switched towards a successful launch of the euro. 
How quickly did the reduction of the interest rates on government bonds translate into lower 
retail rates? Figure 2 below shows the retail interest rates on short term loans to enterprises in 
SPG and euro area averages. 
















































































































Source: ECB, Statistics, Retail interest rate statistics, euro area retail interest rates and National Retail Interest Rates. 
Overall, the picture is similar to the situation with the interest rates on long term government 
bonds. In Greece and Portugal the EMU participation resulted in a significant reduction of the retail 
interest rates towards the euro area average. Spain is a different case here, since its retail short 
term  interest  rates  had  been  below  the  European  average  for  some  time  before  the  common Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Nominal and Real Convergence in Spain, Portugal and Greece… 
currency. The picture for rates on long term retail loans to enterprises is similar, except that Spain 
also converges to the average from above. 
5.2  Consumer Prices 
As a precondition to the EMU accession, the participating countries had to achieve a high 
degree of convergence of inflation rates (at most 1.5 percentage points above the average of the 
three lowest inflation countries). A characteristic feature of the EMU experience of the SPG since 
then has been a slight rebound and then persistence of the resulting inflation differentials (see 
Figure 3). Annualized inflation rates in the SPG are around 1.5-2 percentage point above the euro 
area average. 
There are two main competing views on the nature of the persistent inflation differentials in the 
EMU.  The first  links  them  to  the  real  convergence  and  the  accompanying  Balassa-Samuelson 
effect. According to this view, as poorer countries catch up with the richer ones, the productivity 
growth is faster in the tradable sector. Higher productivity raises wages in the tradable sector and 
in the nontradable one as well. This wage growth causes the ‘dual inflation’, which is however 
neutral to the export competitiveness of the country, since it only reflects the productivity increase. 
The second view is that higher inflation in some countries reflects domestic demand pressures in 
presence  of  economic  rigidities.  As  a  result  of  rigidities,  such  as  excessively  protective  labor 
market legislation or lack of competition in some sectors, demand pressures result in a growth of 
prices, instead of a growth of output. 
If the inflation differentials observed in the EMU, in particular higher inflation rates in the SPG 
countries, result from the Balassa-Samuelson effect, they pose no threat to economic stability and 
should be welcome as signals of real convergence. (This scenario has been envisaged in the One 
Market,  One  Money  report,  although  the  authors  dismissed  the  importance  of  the  quantitative 
effect on inflation). However, if they result from economic rigidities, they will result in a gradual loss 
of  international  competitiveness  in  those  countries  and  current  account  deficits.  The  particular 
danger of the monetary union is that the exchange rate devaluation cannot restore the equilibrium, 
and,  in  addition,  external  deficits  are  easier  to  be  financed  by  external  borrowing  from  other 
countries, since the exchange rate risk does not prevent them from lending. This would facilitate 
protraction of imbalances and unsustainable buildup of foreign debt. 
These dangers spurred interest in the subject among economists. The above views on inflation 
differentials  and  empirical  evidence  for  either  of  them  are  discussed  at  length  e.g.  in  Alberola 
(2000) and Ortega (2003). Overall, it is still early for a final empirical assessment, but Alberola 
(2000) finds a measure of support for both views in the case of Spain. Ortega (2003) links Spanish 
inflation to a growth of markups, which would suggest insufficient competition in an important part 
of the economy. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Marek Jarociński 
15 
Figure 3. Annual rate of change in consumer prices in SPG and euro area average, monthly,  
1995-2003 
Source: IFS, ECB 
A force less stressed in the theoretical work on the monetary unions (also absent in the One 
Market, One Money and the Delors reports) is that of price levels (of tradable goods) convergence 
across countries. The common currency facilitates cross-border price comparison and arbitrage. 
There  is  some  early  evidence  of  trade  acceleration  between  euro  area  countries  (De  Nardis, 
Vicarelli 2003 estimate the impact of euro alone on trade, controlling for the effect of the reduced 
exchange  rate  volatility,  to  be  between  2.6%  and  6.1%).  Deeper  trade  integration  is  likely  to 
contribute to gradual prices convergence. The convergence should not be expected to ever be full, 
after all a degree of price variation exists also inside countries, but it is likely to become deeper 
within the EMU. 
Rising markups in the cheaper countries of the euro area, found by Ortega (2003), may also 
result from an increase of foreign demand, driven by tradables price differentials. In this case, the 
inflation differentials would also be undisruptive and their impact on the external balance should be 
positive and neutral in the long run. 
Figure 4. Price level of GDP in Spain, Portugal, Greece as a ratio of the euro area average, 1990-2000 
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Figure 4 shows the dynamics of price levels of GDP (calculated in the Penn World Tables) of 
the SPG countries, relative to the euro area average, over the past decade. The price level series 
are very volatile, which suggests serious measurement problems. As it is, the picture shows a 
gradual convergence of country price levels towards the euro area average, at least in the second 
half of the 1990s. 
6.  Convergence of per capita GDP 
It is impossible to conduct a meaningful empirical study of per capita income convergence 
triggered  by  the  EMU  alone  since  the  available  data  is  too  short.  The  monetary  union  is  an 
important  enhancement  of  the  common  market.  However,  even  if  one  believes  in  the  overall 
positive effect of the common market on convergence, there is no compelling reason to expect 
from  it  too  much  of  a  qualitative  change.  More  likely  is  a  broad  continuation  and  gradual 
acceleration of any convergence that might have already been underway. 
Empirical studies of real convergence have been conducted on various datasets with many 
units  observed  on  many  periods.  Most  international  studies  fail  to  detect  unconditional 
convergence, only the conditional one (Mankiw et al. 1992, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995), which 
implies that generally a reduction of inequality is not advancing. Similarly, studies of European 
regions  (Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1995),  Canova  and  Marcet  (1995))  conclude  that  regions 
converge  to  their  individual  and  widely  varying  steady  states.  Boldrin  and  Canova  (2001)  find 
convergence only in growth rates, which is a strongly negative message for real convergence, as it 
implies  freezing  of  the  existing  income  differences.  Overall,  neither  convergence  nor,  for  that 
matter, divergence has been empirically confirmed as a general phenomenon. 
Table 4. Real GDP, annual growth rate in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Eurozone average, 1995-2002 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Spain  2.3  2.4  4.0  4.3  4.2  4.2  2.7  2.0 
Portugal  2.3  3.3  3.7  4.7  3.8  3.7  1.6  0.5 
Greece  2.1  2.4  3.5  3.4  3.6  4.2  4.1  4.0 
Euro area  -  1.6  2.8  2.8  2.6  3.5  1.4  0.8 
Sources: National Banks, ECB. 
In the recent years the SPG have been growing faster than the euro area average (except for 
Portugal in 2002) and the real convergence of these countries to the rich European core seems to 
be underway, whether interpreted as a part of the general process or as an exception from the 
rule. Earlier discussion of the trends in foreign and domestic investments in SPG confirms this 
picture  and  seems  to  give  the  EMU,  after  all,  an  important  potential  role  in  inducing  real 
convergence. However, the definitive answer of the impact of the EMU membership on growth has 
to wait until more observations are available. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Marek Jarociński 
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7  Isolating the effect of the euro 
Previous sections report noticeable changes in a number of macroeconomic variables during 
the  process  of  EMU  accession.  However,  it  remains  unclear  to  what  extent  these  trends  are 
caused by  direct, microeconomic effects of the euro, its macroeconomic effects, effects of the 
economic policies accompanying the accession, and finally external, unrelated factors. 
The microeconomic effects of the common currency have been described in the Emerson et al. 
(1992) One Market One Money report. Most prominently, increased credibility of the monetary 
policy  and  the  reduction  of  the  exchange  rate  risk  are  supposed  to  permanently  improve  the 
investment  climate.  In  addition,  smaller  costs  of  international  transactions  should  boost  overall 
efficiency of the economy. 
On  the  other  hand,  lower  interest  rates  constitute  a  macroeconomic  shock,  which  could 
equivalently  be  generated  by  the  expansionary  policy  of  the  central  bank.  What  makes  the 
difference is the permanence of this shock. In theory, we could decompose the effect of lower 
interest rates into the usual effect of monetary expansion, and the remainder, which we would 
ascribe to the improved long term business climate and classify together with the aforementioned 
microeconomic effects. 
Macroeconomic policy accompanying the accession, in particular the fiscal tightening in order 
to bring inflation and debt in line with Maastricht criteria, constitutes another factor behind the 
observed developments. Politically, this policy has been the result of the EMU accession, but it is a 
reasonable  policy  option  also  in  absence  of  any  monetary  union  prospects. 
Finally, the observed behavior of the economies of the accession countries is influenced by usual 
dynamics of international business cycles. 
In this section we try to isolate the direct, microeconomic effect of the EMU. Therefore, in 
assessing this effect we have to control for the usual impact of lower interest rates, fiscal tightening 
and for international conditions. In order to accomplish this, we consider the econometric model 
used in Mountford and Uhlig (2002) to analyze responses of the US economy to fiscal, monetary 
and business cycle shocks. We estimate a similar model for Spain, augmenting it with a dummy 
variable indicating the EMU accession. Therefore, we hope that the coefficient of this variable 
captures the pure effect of the EMU after taking into account the impact of fiscal, monetary and 
business cycle shocks. 
In particular, we estimate a vector auto-regression (VAR) for Spain (fiscal data for Greece and 
Portugal was insufficient) with government revenues, expenditures, real GDP, CPI and interbank 
interest  rate  (and  optionally  gross  fixed  capital  formation  and  narrow  money)1.  As  exogenous 
variables we add current and lagged world price of oil, constant term and a dummy variable which 
takes a value of zero in the beginning of the sample, and one after a specified cutoff date, and 
which is supposed to capture the effect of the EMU. The coefficient of interest is the one on this 
dummy variable. Since the responses to the structural shocks are out of scope of this analysis, it is 
                                                  
1 Quarterly data  in logs, except for interest rates in levels. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Nominal and Real Convergence in Spain, Portugal and Greece… 
not necessary to identify the structural model, as in Mountford and Uhlig (2002). The effects of the 
fiscal and monetary shocks are already taken account of in the above reduced form model which 
can  be  estimated  by  the  OLS.  Therefore,  the  coefficient  on  the  dummy  variable  captures  the 
persistent impact of any events at the cutoff date, purged from the effects of the usual interaction 
between the macroeconomic variables.  
Similar approach to measuring the effect of the euro was applied in De Nardis and Vicarelli 
(2003) who estimate the coefficient of the dummy variable in a dynamic (panel) model explaining 
trade. An alternative would be to search for a change in the slope coefficients, but this approach 
would require more data points after the EMU accession and is currently infeasible. 
It is not clear which of the important steps towards the EMU accession, listed in Table 1, was 
the economically most important one. Additionally, any of them could have been anticipated or 
could work with a lag. Therefore, we take an agnostic approach and try to include, one by one, 
dummies starting in each quarter from 1997Q1, 1997Q2 etc. up to 2002Q1. The figure below plots 
their t-statistics together with the 90% and 95% two sided critical values, against the starting date 
of the EMU dummy. 
Figure 5. T-statistics of the euro indicator variable in the equations GDP, CPI, interest rate and gross 
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A: sample 1975Q1-2003Q1; data in log levels; each equation contains lags 1-2 of government 
revenues, expenditures, GDP, interest rate, CPI; exogenous controls: lags 0-2 of log oil prices. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Marek Jarociński 
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C: as in panel A, except: 3 lags of each variable 
The main feature of the plot is the lack of significance of the EMU dummies in explaining real 
GDP, prices, interest rates and investment dynamics. This finding is generally robust to reducing or 
increasing  the  number  of  lags,  including  or  excluding  narrow  money  and  gross  fixed  capital 
formation among the endogenous variables of the VAR, including or excluding the linear trend or 
performing the analysis in first differences. It should be kept in mind that each of the points on the 
plots corresponds to one estimated regression, so figure 1 presents results of t-tests from 252 
regressions and we find only 3-4 significant ones among them. 
Concluding, we find no robust evidence that the introduction of the euro per se was the driving 
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macroeconomic variables during the accession, which are easy to logically associate with some of 
the steps towards EMU accession. However, the econometric analysis shows that these changes 
can be sufficiently forecast by lagged values of macroeconomic indicators. Therefore, we can’t 
reject  the  claim  that  it  is  the  policies  accompanying  the  introduction  of  the  euro,  and  not 
microeconomic effects of the common currency, that matter in the case of Spain. 
8  Conclusions 
Although the common currency is being partly blamed for the current slowdown and tensions 
in the EMU, the impact of the accession on the poorest and less stable countries has been quite 
beneficial.  Convergence,  which  for  SPG  means  faster  growth,  lower  interest  rates  and  more 
stability, has been progressing, if not accelerating, under the new monetary regime. 
The requirements of the EMU membership helped these countries to perform a lasting fiscal 
adjustment  and,  as  a  result,  bring  their  external  debt  on  a  more  sustainable  path.  The  EMU 
accession seems to have helped them to attract more foreign direct investments. Interest rates 
have roughly converged from quite high levels down to the euro area average already months prior 
to the actual EMU accession. This helped strengthening domestic investment rates too. Growth 
performance of the SPG has been better than the euro area average. 
However,  some  tensions  are  also  appearing.  It  seems  that  instead  of  the  convergence  of 
inflation rates, price levels of the SPG have been converging to the euro area averages, which 
meant higher than average inflation. Current account deficits widened significantly. More research 
is needed to determine the nature of those processes, but any rigidities, especially resulting from 
labor market regulation, should be exacerbating those problems. 
A question arises, to what extent the EMU accession has a positive impact directly: by its 
credibility effects, reduction of exchange rate risk and costs, and to what extent the accession is a 
political device that forces countries to adopt sound economic policies, in particular to revamp their 
fiscal policies. The econometric analysis for Spain suggests that it is the policies that matter.  
In  any  case,  the  experience  of  the  SPG  is  encouraging  for  the  new  member  states  facing 
accession to the EMU in the coming years. Judging by this experience, if policies leading to satisfying 
the convergence criteria are firmly on course, the benefits can start to be reaped already before the 
accession. This concerns particularly the reduction of interest rates, both on government debt and retail 
loans, and probably also the accelerated FDI inflow. The evidence for Spain notwithstanding, it is not 
inconceivable that microeconomic effects are stronger for the new member states. In this case, stability 
imported from EMU would be expected to stimulate investments and growth. 
Deeper deficits of the current account and upward pressure on prices may also be inevitable. 
They  may  result  from  the  growth  acceleration  and  Balassa-Samuelson  effect,  or  from  some 
overheating of domestic demand coupled with weak competition and labor market rigidities. Overall, 
the EMU accession should be viewed as a powerful positive force complementary to the domestic 
fiscal adjustment, competition enhancing and labor market reforms, but not as their substitute. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 256 - Marek Jarociński 
21 
References: 
Alberola, E. (2000), Interpreting inflation differentials in the euro area, Economic Bulletin, Banco de 
Espana, April. 
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X (1995), Economic Growth, McGraw-Hill Inc. 
Boldrin,  Michele  and  Fabio  Canova  (2001),  Inequality  and  convergence  in  Europe’s  regions: 
reconsidering European regional policies, Economic Policy, v.32, April. 
Canova, F., and A. Marcet, The Poor Stay Poor: non-convergence across countries and regions, 
Discussion Paper No. 1265, CEPR, London. 
Committee  for  the  Study  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (1989),  Report  on  Economic  and 
Monetary  Union  in  the  European  Community,  report  to  European  Council  by  a  Committee 
chaired  by  J.  Delors  (the  ‘Delors  Report’),  Office  for  Official  Publications  of  the  European 
Communities, Luxemburg. 
De Nardis, Sergio and Claudio Vicarelli (2003), the Impact of the Euro on Trade The (Early) Effect 
Is Not So Large, ENEPRI Working Paper No.17. 
ECB, various materials available at: http://www.ecb.int 
Emerson, M., D. Gros, A. Italianer, J. Pisani-Ferry and H. Reichenbach (1992), One Market, One 
Money:  An  Evaluation  of  the  Potential  Benefits  and  Costs  of  Forming  an  Economic  and 
Monetary Union, Oxford University Press. 
EMI (1996), Progress Towards Convergence 1996, available at: http://www.ecb.int 
EMI (1998), Convergence report 1998, available at: http://www.ecb.int 
Gros,  D.  (2002),  Central  Europe  on  the  Way  to  EMU,  Rivista  di  Politica  Economica,  January-
February. 
Heston,  Alan,  Robert  Summers  and  Bettina  Aten,  Penn  World  Table  Version  6.1,  Center  for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. 
Mankiw, G., D. Romer and D. Weil (1992), A contribution to the empirics of economic growth, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. CVII. 
Mountford,  Andrew  and  Harald  Uhlig,  2002,  What  are  the  effects  of  fiscal  policy  shocks?, 
unpublished. 
Ortega. E. (2003), Persistent inflation differentials in Europe, Economic Bulletin, Banco de Espana, 
April. 
Perotti,  R.  (1996),  Fiscal  Consolidation  in  Europe:  Composition  Matters,  American  Economic 
Review, 86(2): 105-110. 
Wilfling, B. (2001), Since when have FOREX markets incorporated EMU into currency pricing? 
Evidence from four exchange rate series, HWWA discussion paper 118. 
 